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1 Introduction
In recent years, several studies have documented that the foreign-owned
firms tend to pay higher wages than the domestically-owned firms. 1 This
finding has potentially important implications since, partly as a result of
increased globalization, the number foreign-owned firms is growing in many
countries. However, the direction of causality between foreign ownership and
wages remains unclear. We do not know whether foreign investors acquire
skill-intensive firms that pay high wages or whether the foreign ownership,
in itself, has a genuine positive eﬀect on wages and the skill-structure of
the firms. Moreover, little is known about the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of
foreign ownership on wages of workers in diﬀerent skill groups.
In this paper, we use rich Finnish plant-level panel data with matched
information on the worker characteristics of the plants to study the eﬀect of
foreign acquisition on employment and wages. This study aims to contribute
to the literature in three ways. First of all, we argue that these data allow us
to disentangle the direction of causality more carefully than has been done
in previous studies. In particular, we use various propensity score match-
ing methods, including the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching developed by
Heckman et al (1997), in addition to more traditional regression techniques.
The central idea in these methods is to base the estimation of the eﬀects on
a careful matching of cases and controls by a rich set of observable charac-
teristics. Second, the matched information on the employee characteristics
by skill groups makes it possible to disentangle the eﬀect of foreign owner-
ship on wages from its eﬀects on the quality of the work force. Furthermore,
this information allows us to examine the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of for-
eign acquisition on wages and employment. Third, the long time-span of
our data, 13 years, enables us to look at the eﬀects of foreign acquisition
in the long-run. Hiring and firing costs may be delay the eﬀects of foreign
acquisition. By looking at the eﬀects of acquisition in several periods after
it has taken place, we can take these delays into account.
We believe that Finland is an interesting case study for the eﬀects of for-
1See e.g. Aitken et al., 1996, Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2001, 2003, and Conyon et al., 2001
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eign ownership. It is a typical example of a small open economy where the
foreign investment plays an important role. Furthermore, our data cover
the years 1988-2001 in which the share of foreign direct investments rose
rapidly in Finland. This increase is depicted in figure 1 and it partly reflects
the worldwide trend in foreign direct investment. But the years 1988-2001
were also an interesting period in the Finnish economic history that marked
two phenomena that undoubtedly led to the increase in the share of foreign-
owned firms. First, in the early 1990’s Finland experienced a very severe
recession and the recovery from this crisis was associated with a rapid re-
structuring of the economy and a growth of new industries: in particular,
the export-orientated high-tech sector.2 Second, Finland joined the Euro-
pean Union in 1995, which naturally removed a lot of barriers to foreign
investment in the Finnish economy.
The results derived by both matching and regression methods indicate
that foreign acquisition has a positive eﬀect on wages in all the skill groups.
This wage increase is not immediate, but happens within 1-3 years from the
acquisition. The magnitude of this eﬀect increases with the level of schooling
of the workers. The foreign-owned firms reduce, albeit slightly and slowly,
the share of highly educated workers in their work force. However, the highly
educated workers that remain in the acquired plants are paid considerably
more than the identical workers in domestically-owned plants.
The paper is organized as follows: Next section briefly describes the
theoretical background for the analysis and reviews some previous empirical
findings. Third section describes the statistical framework. Fourth section
presents the data sets. Fifth section provides the results. The last section
concludes the paper.
2 Background and Previous Evidence
There are several possible reasons why foreign-owned firms pay higher wages
than domestically-owned firms. First, foreign firms need to possess some
firm-specific advantages, such as superior technology, in order to be able
2 see Honkapohja and Koskela. (1999)
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to compete with local firms3. These assets are assumed to raise the pro-
ductivity of the firms. Assuming that workers can bargain over any sur-
plus generated, higher productivity would be expected to generate a greater
surplus and hence higher wage rates4. Second, workers employed by the
multinational enterprise acquire knowledge of the superior technology and
can spread their knowledge to local firms by switching employers. Foreign-
owned firms might pay higher wages in order to prevent workers from moving
to local competitor and spillover this superior knowledge (See Fosfure et al.
2001.). Third, the knowledge-based assets that foreign-owned firms are as-
sumed to have require better trained workers (see Görg, 2001). Workers in
foreign-owned firms are assumed to receive more training and, as a result,
have steeper wage profiles than workers in domestic firms. Fourth, foreign
firms might have size and communication problems compared to domestic
firms. They might seek industrial relations peace with higher wages (see e.g.
Conyon et al., 2002).
The direct eﬀect of foreign ownership on the relative wages and skill
demand is not clear. There are, however, indirect ways how multinational
enterprises can influence the skill demand within a country, industry or a
plant. Foreign firms entering an industry will accelerate the rate of techno-
logical progress. This, in turn, will increase the relative demand and wages
for highly skilled workers in that industry (see e.g. Taylor and Driﬃeld,
(2004). Foreign acquisition is also assumed to be associated with reorga-
nization of existing capacity and introduction of new ideas within the new
plants. The organizational change is expected to raise the demand for skilled
labour, since skills raise the ability to handle new information, and thus, the
skill level of workers tends to reduce the costs of decentralization (see Bres-
nahan et al., 2001).
3Foreign firms operate against disadvantages such as inferior knowledge of local markets
and tastes and inferior connections with local politicians and financial institutions. See
e.g. Caves, 1996, Markusen 1995, and Bloningen and Slaughter, 2001.
4These assets are assumed to have a within-firm public good aspects to them, so they
can be used across all firm’s plants. The higher productivity of multinational parent can
also result in higher wages of their foreign aﬃliates through international profit sharing.
See Budd et al. (2005).
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There exits a growing body of literature, which examine empirically the
relationship between foreign ownership and wages. Among the first ones is
the study by Aitken et al. (1996), which examines the relationship between
wages and foreign investments in Mexico, Venezuela and United States us-
ing data at industry-district-level. They found that a higher level of foreign
ownership in an industry and location was associated with higher wages in
all of these countries. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) replicate the results of
significant positive wage premium of foreign ownership for US using also
industry-regional level data. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001) use cross-section
plant-level data from Indonesia manufacturing and find that foreign-owned
firms pay higher wages even after controlling for plant characteristics, in-
dustry and location.
However, without establishment-level panel data it is impossible to exam-
ine, whether this finding is due to unobservable diﬀerences between foreign-
and domestically-owned plants, or whether the ownership status itself in-
fluences wages. Foreign-owned establishments might pay higher wages than
domestically-owned establishment simply because foreign firms took over
high-wage local establishments. Lipsey and Sjöholm. (2003) attempt to deal
with the problem by using panel data on Indonesian establishments. They
find strong increase in wages after foreign takeovers. The regression results
without establishment- fixed eﬀects show that foreign-owned establishments
paid 29 % more for blue-collar workers and 43 % more white- collar workers
than domestically- owned establishment with similar characteristics. If fixed
eﬀects were introduced the diﬀerentials are 10 and 21 %.
Conyon et al. (2002) examine the productivity- and wage- eﬀects of
foreign acquisitions in the UK using establishment-level panel data for the
period 1988-94. They find that firms which are acquired by foreign com-
panies pay in average 3,4% higher wages than domestic firms. However,
when productivity is added in the control variables, this wage premium dis-
appears. Almeida (2003) study the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on domestic
firms’ wages and skill composition in Portugal using firm-level panel data
for 1991-98. She finds that there exists an important selection eﬀect as for-
eigners "cherry pick" the domestic firms that pay higher wages and employ
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more educated workers. Wages did however increase after the acquisition
The increase was highest for highly educated workers (13%), compared to
that for medium-and low educated ones (5% and 3% respectively). Girma
(2003) investigate the eﬀects of the foreign takeovers on domestic skilled
and unskilled wages using establishment-level panel data for UK. He finds
that skilled workers, on average, experience a post-acquisition increase in
the wage rate following an acquisition by a US firm, while no such eﬀect is
found following acquisition by other nationalities. Martins (2004) examine
the eﬀect of foreign ownership on wages using matched worker-establishment
panel data for Portugal from 1991-99. Using OLS, he finds that foreign firms
pay higher wages, even when firm and worker controls are added. However,
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis, both regression and matching, provide
evidence that workers in firms that were acquired by foreign investors ex-
perience lower wage growth than the ones who were employed in firms that
did not change their ownership status.
Studies which examine the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on relative de-
mand for diﬀerent skill groups are much less numerous and results less clear.
Bloningen and Slaughter (2001) examine the impact of inward FDI flows and
foreign-aﬃliate presence on US skill upgrading using four-digit industry-level
data for manufacturing from 1977 to 1994. They results suggest zero or
negative correlation between increases in foreign-aﬃliate activity and skill
upgrading in the US. Taylor and Driﬃeld (2005) use similar framework with
industry-level panel data to examine the role of foreign direct investment
on wage inequality in UK. They find that FDI has significantly contributed
to increase in the skilled wage bill share. Interestingly, the studies that
use establishment level-panel data seem to find either negative or zero ef-
fect of foreign ownership on demand for highly educated workers. Lipsey
and Sjöholm (2003) examine the changes in employment after takeovers
and find a decrease in number of white-collar workers and a strong increase
in blue-collar workers. Almeida (2003) finds no significant changes in the
workforce’s skill composition following a foreign acquisition for Portuguese
establishments.
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3 Statistical Framework
The goal in this study is to examine the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on
the employment and wages of diﬀerent skill groups in the acquired plants.
We borrow the terminology from program evaluation literature. We define
foreign acquisition as the ”treatment”, D. D = 1 denotes the treatment
state, plant was acquired by a foreign firm, and D = 0 denotes the non-
treatment state, plant was not acquired by foreign firm. Y (D) is the outcome
associated with each state, e.g. wages and the employment share of diﬀerent
skill groups. Treatment group consist of plants that were acquired by foreign
firm. Control group consist of plants that remained domestically-owned.
3.1 Regression model
We begin by estimating the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on post-acquisition
outcome using a linear regression model. The regression model can be de-
scribe as
Yi,t = Xi,tβ +
2X
j=0
Di,t−jδj+1 + αi + ζt + µi,t (1)
where Yi,t,is the variable that describes the outcome of the plant i in period
t (e.g. log. wages or employment share of diﬀerent skill groups), Xi,t is a
vector of observable plant, industry and local labor market characteristics,
and Di,t−j is dummy variables indicating plant’s foreign ownership status at
t−j, αi is the plant-fixed eﬀect, and ζt is the year dummy. The interpretation
of the estimated coeﬃcients on the foreign ownership status, δ1 to δ3, is
the following. Since the model includes plant-fixed eﬀects, we are using
the within-plants variation only, and thus the coeﬃcient on the ownership
variable can be interpreted as the eﬀect of foreign acquisition. The eﬀect
of acquisition that happened within one year from the observation date is
captured by the variable Di,t, the eﬀect of acquisition that happened two
years ago is captured by the variable Di,t−1, and the eﬀect of acquisition
that happened three years ago is captured by the variable Di,t−2. Thus the
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estimated regression model gives an estimate for the foreign acquisition on
outcome immediately after acquisition, 1-2 years after acquisition, and 2-3
years after acquisition. This allows us to see whether the possible changes
in wages and employment of acquired plants happen instantly or after some
adjustment period.
3.2 Matching estimators
Next we estimate the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on employment and wages
using diﬀerent propensity score matching methods. The central idea in
matching methods is that the bias, which arises due to diﬀerences in the
characteristics of treatment and control group, is reduced when the compar-
ison of outcomes is performed using treated and control subjects who are
as similar as possible on their observable characteristics, X. The propensity
score matching method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) proposes a way to
summarize the vector of pre-treatment characteristics, X, into single-index
variable.
We begin by estimating the propensity score. In this study the propen-
sity score is the conditional probability for a plant of being acquired by a
foreign firm. The binary-choice model which describes the probability of
foreign acquisition for plant i is of the form
Dit =
(
1
0
if βXit−1 + ζt + γj + ηr + εit > 0
otherwise
(2)
where Dit is a binary variable which defines plant’s acquisition status at
year t. D = 1, if a plant which was domestically-owned in year t − 1 is
foreign-owned at year t, and D = 0 if which was domestically-owned in year
t− 1 is not foreign-owned at year t5. Xit−1 is a vector of factors that aﬀect
plant’s probability of being acquired by a foreign firm. Since the acquisition
happens between t and t− 1 we use the characteristics from period t− 1 as
the pre-treatment variables. In order to control for unobservable common
5The sample used in matching analysis consists only of plants that were domestically-
owned in the first observation years, i.e. before the period t.
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industry, region and time eﬀects the model also includes full set of controls
for fixed industry (γj), region (ηr), and time-eﬀects (ζt).
The next step is to use the estimated propensity score in order to estimate
the average eﬀect of foreign acquisition6. The idea is to use the outcome
of the non-treated observations (plants that remained domestically-owned)
with similar propensity score to proxy, what would have happened to treated
observations (acquired plants) in the non-treatment situation. The Average
eﬀect of Treatment on Treated (ATT) for all type of cross section -matching
estimators can be written as
dATT (S) = X
i∈T∩SP
1
NT

Y (1)i −
X
ijωij
j∈C∩SP
Y (0)j

 (3)
where Y (1)i is the treatment outcome for unit (plant) i, Y (0)j is the non-
treatment outcome for unit j (comparison group outcome), NT is the number
of units in treatment group, T , and C denotes the set of control units, SP
denotes the region of common support and ωij is the weight that is used to
match control units with each treatment unit.
Matching methods rely crucially on the assumption that there are no
unobservable factors which aﬀects both the selection into treatment and the
outcome. In order to control for the possible bias that is due to selection
on unobservables we compute the average eﬀect of treatment on treated us-
ing the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching estimator (Heckman et al., 1997).
This estimator compares the diﬀerence in the outcome before and after the
treatment of treated units with the diﬀerence in the outcome of the non-
treated units in the same period. It allows for the existence of unobserved
time-invariant factors that aﬀect the selection. The formula for ATT can
6This is after testing that the balancing property holds, i.e. whether observations
with the same propensity score have the same distribution of observable characteristics
independently of treatment status. We use algoritm silimar to Ichino and Becker (2003).
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calculated as
dATT (S) =X
i∈T
1
NT

(Y (1)it − Y (0)it−1)−
X
ijωij
j∈C
(Y (0)jt − Y (0)jt−1)


(4)
where t is the post acquisition time period and t − 1 is the pre-acquisition
time period.
4 Data
4.1 Description of the data sources
The main data source in this study is the Plant Level Employment Statis-
tics Data on Average Characteristics (PESA). It is a longitudinal data on
Finnish establishments, with linked information on worker characteristics
aggregated on the establishment level by skill groups. The linked worker
characteristics-establishment data are constructed by linking data on work-
ers in the Employment Statistics database of Statistics Finland to data on
plants of Business Registers and Industrial Statistics. The data set cov-
ers all the private sector establishments (except traﬃc and construction)
with more than two workers. The time period is 1988-2001. The number
of establishments is around 50 000 each year. Employees are aggregated
into 70 diﬀerent skill groups by education, age and sex (see table 1). The
data contain information on aggregate worker characteristics for each skill
group, such as number of people, average monthly wage, general working
experience, tenure and education. The data set does not have any specific
information on establishment characteristics. However, each enterprise and
its plant, has a unique identification code, which can be used to match
additional information from other registers on the database.
Another major data source used in the analysis is the Longitudinal Data
on Plants in Manufacturing (LDPM), which is constructed especially for
research purposes from Annual Industry Statistics. For the period 1974-
1994 it covers all manufacturing sector plants with more than 5 workers and
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for the period 1995-2001 it covers the plants of firms employing at least 20
persons. The number of plants varies between 9000 and 3000 each year.
For the purpose of our analysis we form data set by linking the PESA
data set with LDPM data. The linked data set covers manufacturing plants
from the years 1988-2001. As the LDPM data set for the years 1995-2001
consists only the plants of firms that employ at least 20 persons, the number
of observations per year is considerably smaller after 1994. In order to have
consistent data set we thus restrict the sample to cover only plants of the
firms which employ at least 20 workers. This sample consists 46 290 plant-
year observations.
The variables describing the employee characteristics are obtained from
the PESA data set. All this variables are skill-group averages in the es-
tablishment. The main variables describing employee characteristics are:
monthly wage, employment, wage bill share, tenure, age, and education.
Employment describes the number of workers in a skill group working in an
establishment during the last week of the year. The average monthly wage
is calculated as the skill group average of the average monthly wages of in-
dividual workers who were employed in the establishment during the last
week of the year. The average monthly wage for each individual employed
is calculated by dividing the wage income by months of employment. The
monthly wage bill for each skill group is formed by multiplying the average
monthly wage of the skill group by the number of workers in the skill group
employed in the establishment during the last week of the year. Age is the
average age of workers in the skill group employed in the establishment dur-
ing the last week of the year. Average education is calculated as the average
of the years of schooling for each skill group, and average tenure is calculated
as the average of the months of tenure in the skill group.
Variables describing the plant characteristics, including the foreign own-
ership status, are from the LDPM data set. The variable defining foreign
ownership status is created using the information on the share of foreign
owners of the plant. An establishment is labeled as foreign-owned if the
share of foreign ownership is at least 20%7. The other main establishment
7We have two main reasons to us the 20 % threshold. First, Most of the previous
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characteristics used in the analysis are sales, real value added, real capital
stock and exports.
We use two diﬀerent samples in this analysis. In the basic regressions (de-
scribed in section 3.1.) we use all the observations from the matched PESA-
LDPM data for which we have information on the characteristics needed
in regressions. These include the information on plant’s foreign ownership
status in the current year, and in the two previous observation years. This
sample consists of plants from the years 1990-2001. In the matching analysis
we use diﬀerent sample. The construction of this sample is described below.
4.2 Matching Sample Construction
The sample of plants that was used in the matching analysis in this article is
constructed as follows. From the overall data base, we first identify plants,
which we can observe in the data set at least two consecutive years before
the current year, and which were domestically-owned in all the years before
the current year. We label the current year as the period 1. The previous
years are labeled as 0 and −1, and the following years 2 and 3. We divide
these plants into treatment and control groups. The treatment group is
the plants which were acquired by foreign firms in the period between 0
and 1. The comparison group is the plants which remained domestically-
owned until the period 3. We remove from the sample all the plants that do
not have information on all the observational characteristics that are used
in matching and regressions. Since in matching we are using information
from two years before the acquisition, and examine the outcome until the
third year after acquisition, we can use only information on plants that we
can observe for at least five consecutive years. The final matching sample
consists of 14 441 observations. It covers the years 1990-1999. The number
of foreign-acquired plants is 284. The number of observations in control
group is 14 157 .
studies label establishment as foreign-owned if 10 % or 20% of its ownership is foreign
(e.g. Bloningen and Slaughter, 2001, Aitken et al., 1996, Almeida, 2003). Second, most
(88 %.) of the plants in our data with at least 20 % foreign ownership have more than
50% foreign ownership. We use 50% threshold for robustness checking.
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5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Evidence
Table 2 reports the share of foreign-owned plants in the LDPM/PESA in
1989-2001 and the share of workers employed in foreign-owned plants in
the data set. The share of foreign-owned plants has increased significantly
during the period in Finland. While in the late 1980’s only around 4% of
plants were foreign-owned, in 2001 the share is 19%. Table 1 also shows
how much of this increase is due to takeovers of domestic plants by foreign
firms (acquisitions), and how much due to new plants started-up by foreign
firms. Most of the increase in the number of foreign-owned plants is due to
acquisitions. The lower panel of table2 shows that the increase in the share
in the employment of foreign-owned plants has been even more rapid than
the increase in the number of plants, from 5 to 22%. Acquisitions contribute
for most of the increase.
Before presenting the matching and regression results it is interesting
to see whether there are significant diﬀerences between wages and other
observable characteristics of foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants
in Finnish manufacturing. Table 3 reports the mean values of the main
characteristics for the foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants in the
sample. The results imply that foreign-owned plants pay higher wages for
both highly and low educated workers than domestically-owned plants8. But
they also have other observable characteristics which can explain higher
wages: they are bigger, older, employ more skilled workers, are more likely
to export, or to have R&D activity. The average employee characteristics
of these plants vary as well. Foreign-owned plants employ workers who are
older, have more years of schooling, and who have a longer tenure.
Evidently, this does not tell us whether the foreign-owned plants were
diﬀerent from the domestic-owned plants already before the acquisition hap-
pened. Table 4 describes the diﬀerences in the observable characteristics of
8”Low educated” refers to people with basic, vocational and lower secondary educa-
tion. ”Highly educated” refers to people with educational qualifications from colleges,
polytechnics or universities.
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acquired and non-acquired plants from the pre-and post-acquisition peri-
ods. The sample consists of plants for which we can find information on
observable characteristics 2 years before the possible acquisition and 3 years
after the acquisition. The pre-acquisition periods are marked as -1,0, and
post-acquisition periods, 1,2, and 3. The acquisition happens between 0 and
1. The result shows that the plants which were acquired by foreign firms
had characteristics which are associated with higher wages even before the
acquisition happened. They are bigger, have higher sales, they have larger
share of exports from they total sales, they employ workers that are older,
have more schooling and longer tenure. In addition they employ less fe-
males and are more capital-intensive and productive. The diﬀerence in the
characteristics remains after acquisition.
Next rows in table 4 report the diﬀerences in the four diﬀerent outcome
measures from the two periods preceding acquisition until the third year
after acquisition. The outcome measures are: 1) logarithm of average wage
of low educated workers in the plant, 2) logarithm of average wage of highly
educated workers in the plant, 3) share of highly educated workers in em-
ployment, and 4) share of highly educated workers in total wage bill. The
result show that foreign acquired plants pay higher wages for both highly
and low educated workers even before the acquisition occurs. The diﬀerence
in the wages increases after acquisition and continues increasing until the
third year after acquisition. The acquired plants also employ more highly
educated workers before they become foreign-owned. The diﬀerence remains
after acquisition, but diminishes in time.
5.2 Regression results for the whole sample
As shown in table 3, foreign-owned plants in Finland pay higher wages than
domestically-owned plants, but also have other characteristics that are re-
lated to higher wages. We now ask whether foreign-owned plants pay higher
wages given these characteristics, industry, and location. We begin our
analysis by running an OLS regression on wages of diﬀerent skill groups.
Results are reported in table 5. The first column (model 1) is an OLS speci-
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fication, where we control for various plant-, and worker-characteristics9. In
addition the specification includes controls for common time-, region-, and
two-digit-industry- eﬀects. Consistently with previous studies, the pooled
OLS result show that foreign-owned plants pay higher wages even after con-
trolling for the plant-, and worker-characteristics, and for industry, region
and common time eﬀects. The foreign wage premium is higher for highly
educated workers than for less educated workers: 0,052 and 0,036 respec-
tively.
Regression analysis with rich set of controls for plant- and worker- char-
acteristics within regions and within industries is likely to eliminate some of
the bias that arises from the result of the possible selection of high-wage es-
tablishments for acquisition by foreign-firms. However, there may be some
unmeasured characteristics that are associated with both high wages and
foreign ownership that bias the results. In order to control for these charac-
teristics model 2 includes plant-specific fixed eﬀects. When fixed-eﬀects are
introduced the foreign-ownership wage premium is reduced to 0,013 for low
educated workers and to 0,015 for highly educated workers.
The last columns in table 5 report the results for a specification which in-
cludes plant fixed-eﬀects and foreign ownership dummies for current period,
and for two previous periods. This means that plant’s foreign-ownership
status is allowed to aﬀect wages in the current year, and also in the two
years after the change in ownership (acquisition) has happened. The results
indicate that the eﬀect of foreign ownership grows in time. For low educated
workers the eﬀect of foreign ownership is strongest in the second year after
acquisition, and for the highly educated workers on the third year.
Table 6 reports the results of the eﬀect of foreign ownership on the share
of highly educated workers in plant’s employment and total wage bill. The
results of the diﬀerent specification, with or without plant fixed eﬀects, indi-
cate that foreign-owned plants employ slightly more highly educated workers
than domestically-owned plants. However, the results from the third speci-
fication suggests that this diﬀerence is not likely to remain after acquisition.
9The worker characteristics are skill-group averages at plant level.
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5.3 Results for the matching sample
The next important issue is whether the eﬀect of foreign acquisition is het-
erogeneous with respect to observational characteristics. If this is the case,
we must make sure a suitable comparison group exits. One way to address
this problem is to use propensity score matching methods. The crucial
requirement in matching is, that we take into account all the possible ob-
servational characteristics that might aﬀect both the probability of being
acquired by foreign firm and the outcome. In order to ensure this we will
use rich set of worker, plant and region characteristics from diﬀerent pre-
acquisition periods. Since we want to examine how the eﬀect of foreign
acquisition evaluates in time, we need to have information of the outcome
variables from 3 post-acquisition periods. These requirements mean that the
sample that can be used in matching is considerable smaller, as described
in section 4.2. In this section we report the regression and matching results
for this matching sample.
The propensity score, the conditional probability of being acquired by
foreign firm, is estimated by parametric probit model. The results of the
probit estimations are presented in table 7. The dependent variable gets
value one if the plant was acquired by foreign firm between periods 0 and
1. The variables which are use to predict the probability of being acquired
by a foreign firm, i.e. pre-treatment variables, are from the pre-acquisition
periods 0 and −1. The pre-acquisition characteristics from period 0 include
plant size (number of employees), squared plant size, logarithm of total sales
of the plant, export/sales ratio and its square, share of exporting plants in
two-digit industry, and share of foreign-owned plants in the two-digit indus-
try, and total sales in the region (to control for the size of the market). The
information from plant average characteristics are from period −1. These
include the average years of schooling of plant’s employees, average age
of plant’s employees, average tenure of plant’s employees and the square
of average tenure10. In addition the specification includes two-digit region
10_0 in end of the variable refers to period just before acquisition (0), and _1 to period
1-2 years before acquisition (-1).
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controls, one-digit industry controls and full set of time dummies.
The estimation results indicate that plant size has a negative eﬀect on
the probability of being acquired by a foreign firm, once plant’s total sales
in the period are taken into account. Plant’s sales have a significant positive
impact on the acquisition probability. If the sales variable is excluded from
the regression the plant size variable gets highly positive and significant
coeﬃcient. Plant’s export/sales ratio is positively related to the acquisi-
tion probability. However, the share of exporting plants in an industry is
negatively related to acquisition probability once plant’s own exports are
taken into account. This might indicate that these industries have higher
transport costs, and firms are more likely to acquire plants directly from
these industries rather than decide to trade. The share of foreign-owned
plants in industry predicts positively the likelihood of being acquired. This
is expected, since this variable might capture many unobservable industry-
specific factors that lead foreign firms to acquire plants from these industries.
The variable describing sales in the region, i.e. market size, gets positive but
insignificant coeﬃcient. Next we look at the eﬀect of plant’s average em-
ployee characteristics on the acquisition probability. Plants that pay high
wages in period −1 are more likely to end up being foreign-owned between
0 and 1. Also plants with highly educated and high tenure workers seem
to be more attractive to foreign firms. Workers’ average age decreases the
probability of foreign acquisition.
Next we estimate the eﬀect of foreign acquisition using the estimated
propensity score. The first rows in table 8 show the eﬀect of acquisition
on the average wages of the low educated workers in a plant in the period
just following the acquisition, t =1. The first columns show the results from
cross-section matching. The dependent variable is the level of the wages in
the period. As a benchmark we report a results from a regression in the first
column, where the outcome variable is regressed on all the X’s that are used
to estimate the propensity score, and on a dummy which explains whether
the plant is foreign-owned or not. We impose the common support condition,
i.e. include only the observations, which have the propensity score within
the common support region. The estimated coeﬃcient on foreign-acquisition
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is negative -0.012 and not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
The next two columns present the estimated eﬀects of foreign acquisition
on average wages using diﬀerent matching estimators. The nearest-neighbor
estimator with replacement gives slightly stronger negative eﬀect (-0.024),
but it is still not statistically significantly diﬀerent from zero. Next column
reports the results from Kernel matching. While nearest neighbor matching
uses only those control group observations that are closest to treated units,
Kernel matching uses all the control group observations, but weights each
observation according to its distance from the treated unit. Kernel matching
estimator shows strong positive eﬀect (0.056)11.
The last three columns report the results from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
regression- and matching estimations. The dependent variable is the diﬀer-
ence of the wages between the pre-acquisition period (0) and the diﬀerent
post-acquisition time periods. The fourth column shows the result from
regression, where the change in the logarithm of monthly wages of low edu-
cated workers from 0 to 1 is regressed on foreign-ownership dummy and on
all the controls that were used to estimate the propensity score. The next
columns report the results from nearest-neigbour and kernel diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences matching. The results show that foreign acquisition does not
have any significant eﬀect on average wages of low educated workers. The
estimated eﬀect varies from —0.002 to 0.001. There seems to be much less
diﬀerences between regression, kernel and nearest neighbor estimates than
with cross-section matching estimators. This indicates that the cross-section
matching assumptions (conditional independence assumption) might not
hold for our sample, and once the permanent diﬀerences between the plants
are taken into account by diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching or regression,
the result seem to be more robust.
11We use here Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth 0.06. We also tried other bandwidths,
such as 0.01 and 0.02. With smaller bandwidth choices the kernel estimates became smaller
and less significant and thus, more closer to the nearest neighbour estimates. This makes
sense, since the smaller the bandwidth choice, more weight is put on the control group
observations which have propensity score that is closest to the treated units. The fact that
the bandwidth choice makes a diﬀerence might indicate that the cross-section matching
assumptions do not hold. The bandwidth choice did not have significant eﬀect to the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching estimator.
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The changes in employment and wages that are caused by foreign acqui-
sition might not happen instantly. Next rows in table 8 report the results on
the eﬀect on the wages of low educated workers in the second year following
the acquisition. The cross-section matching results are still quite unrobust,
although clearly more positive than in the first year. The diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences matching and regression indicate that the foreign acquisition has
a positive and highly significant eﬀect on the wages of low educated work-
ers in the second year after acquisition. The magnitude of the eﬀect varies
between 0,042-0,040. When looking at the wages at the third year after
acquisition the result remain robust. Low educated workers in plants which
were acquired by foreign firms earn significantly more in the third year after
acquisition than workers in plants that remained domestic during that time.
The diﬀerence in the wages has, however, decreased a bit from the previous
year.
Table 9 reports the results of the eﬀect of foreign acquisition for highly
educated workers. Both the matching and regression results indicate that
acquisition does not have a significant eﬀect on the wages in the year im-
mediately after acquisition. As in previous table, the diﬀerence-in diﬀer-
ences results are more robust to diﬀerent estimation methods. In the second
year, the eﬀect of foreign acquisition is significant and positive, varying from
0.021 to 0.079. In the third year after acquisition the eﬀect seems to be even
stronger, varying between 0.014-0.084. Thus, it seems that acquisition raises
the wages of highly educated workers, but this raise is not immediate.
Table 10 shows the results of the eﬀect of the acquisition on the share
of highly educated workers in plant’s employment. The result indicate that
foreign acquisition does not have any eﬀect on the skill composition of plant’s
workforce in the first year after acquisition. In the following years, the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results indicate significant and negative eﬀect of the
foreign acquisition. Table 11 replicates the results using the share of highly
educated workers in total wage bill as the outcome variable. The result
indicate again no significant eﬀect on the first year, but negative eﬀect on
the second and third year. The magnitude of the eﬀect is slightly lower than
for the employment share, which might indicate that the relative increase in
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high skilled wages compensates the drop in total employment share.
Finally we look whether there is even more heterogeneity in wage eﬀects
according to the educational level of workers. Table 12 reports the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences matching results for the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages
of four diﬀerent educational categories: basic, vocational, lower university,
and higher university. The results again indicate that the magnitude of the
eﬀect depends on worker’s educational level. There is a clear increase in the
magnitude of the eﬀect by the level of schooling of the workers.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the eﬀect of foreign acquisition on wages and employ-
ment of diﬀerent skill groups using panel data on Finnish establishments for
the years 1988-2001. Exploiting the availability of rich set of pre-acquisition
controls, we use various regression and propensity score matching methods,
including diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching. Both regression and matching
results indicate that foreign acquisition has a positive eﬀect on wages. The
magnitude of this eﬀect increases with the level of schooling of the work-
ers. The wage increase is not immediate, but happens within 1-3 years from
the acquisition. This can be due to various reasons. First, foreign firms
do more on-the-job-training, and thus the wage growth in foreign-owned
firms is higher. This implies that wages in plants that are acquired by
foreign-owned firms do not raise immediately, but within some years after
acquisition. The finding that wages seem to rise more rapidly for highly ed-
ucated workers might indicate bigger returns to training for highly educated
workers12. Second reason for the fact that wages do not rise immediately,
is that acquisition can involve organizational changes within plant, and the
implementation of new work practises might take time. Third, the changes
in average wages can be associated with changes of employment composition
of plant’s workforce. Since there are adjustment costs associated with these
employment changes, they are not likely to be immediate. Finally, due to
possible measurement problems, the exact timing of the acquisition might
12See e.g. see Altonji and Spletzer (1991).
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be uncertain. The result on employment eﬀect indicate that acquired plants
reduce, although slightly and slowly, the share of highly educated workers
in their employment. This finding, although quite surprising, is in line with
findings from the few earlier studies that have examined the changes in skill
mix after acquisition (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2003, Almeida, 2003).
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Figure 1 Foreign direct investment in Finland in 1991-2001, stock of investment at the end of the year, 
EUR million 
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Table 1 Disaggregation of establishment's work force in PESA data 
Age 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
Sex m f m f m f m f m f 
Educational level:           
1. basic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2.vocational / technical 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
3. vocational/ other 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
4. low. univ./technical 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
5. low. univ./  other 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 
6. higher univ./technical 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
7. higher univ./other 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
 
Table 2 Number and employment of foreign-owned plants in the sample of Finnish manufacturing 
plants in 1989-2001 
Number of plants 
 All plants Foreign-owned plants 
 All All foreign owned Foreign owned at t-1 New plants Acquired plants 
Year Freq. Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
1989 3775 154 4.08 114 3.02 32 0.85 8 0.21 
1990 3941 173 4.39 126 3.20 27 0.69 20 0.51 
1991 3758 174 4.63 138 3.67 23 0.61 13 0.35 
1992 3390 148 4.37 120 3.54 13 0.38 15 0.44 
1993 3263 290 8.89 116 3.56 52 1.59 122 3.74 
1994 3364 323 9.60 246 7.31 33 0.98 44 1.31 
1995 2951 294 9.96 261 8.84 20 0.68 13 0.44 
1996 2994 298 9.95 261 8.72 18 0.60 19 0.63 
1997 2966 410 13.82 261 8.80 23 0.78 126 4.25 
1998 3036 467 15.38 298 9.82 47 1.55 122 4.02 
1999 3000 492 16.40 342 11.40 29 0.97 121 4.03 
2000 3016 469 15.55 395 13.10 47 1.56 27 0.90 
2001 3028 585 19.32 412 13.61 65 2.15 108 3.57 
Employment 
 All plants Foreign-owned plants 
 All All foreign owned Foreign owned at t-1 New plants Acquired plants 
Year Freq. Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
1989 299516 14020 4.68 10398 3.47 3400 1.14 222 0.07 
1990 313516 17708 5.65 12456 3.97 1492 0.48 3757 1.20 
1991 274683 13823 5.03 11533 4.20 599 0.22 1691 0.62 
1992 255073 10597 4.15 8631 3.38 577 0.23 1389 0.54 
1993 244972 14982 6.12 9156 3.74 1347 0.55 4476 1.83 
1994 257383 19720 7.66 14527 5.64 1524 0.59 3669 1.43 
1995 253064 19818 7.83 17783 7.03 554 0.22 1481 0.59 
1996 255878 21063 8.23 16907 6.61 1036 0.40 3120 1.22 
1997 269185 43647 16.21 21006 7.80 994 0.37 21647 8.04 
1998 275450 40728 14.79 27556 10.00 2051 0.74 11118 4.04 
1999 257901 49861 19.33 32097 12.45 1496 0.58 16268 6.31 
2000 263745 50370 19.10 44338 16.81 2068 0.78 3964 1.50 
2001 259915 58954 22.68 47848 18.41 3377 1.30 7729 2.97 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for the sample  
 Domestic-owned Foreign-owned 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Plant size 37297 90.37 3866 101.91 
Plant age 17994 9.33 1989 9.82 
Wage 36998 11928 3838 13617 
Wage low ed. 36806 10926 3796 12125 
Wage highly ed. 34666 15093 3587 17076 
Av. Schooling 36998 11.56 3838 11.81 
Av. Tenure 36998 10.53 3838 11.70 
Av. Age of employees 36998 39.63 3838 40.50 
Share of highly educated 36998 0.21 3838 0.26 
Share of high.ed. in wage bill 36998 0.26 3838 0.32 
Share of female 36998 0.31 3838 0.29 
Value Added 37248 654483 3858 738789 
Export share 35085 0.20 3660 0.27 
R&D unit 37297 0.00 3866 0.01 
Table 4 Difference in the characteristics of acquired and non-acquired plants before and after 
acquisition  in matching sample 
 Acquired plants Non-acquired plants Difference 
Variable  Obs Mean Obs Mean  % 
Pre-acquisition characteristics (from t=0) 
Size_0 284 153.18 14157 115.40 37.79 24.67 
Log(sales)_0 284 9.50 14157 8.91 0.59 6.26 
K/L_0 259 216.67 12682 145.09 71.57 33.03 
Y/L_0  284 19845 14110 10650 9196 46.34 
Export/sales_0 284 0.33 14157 0.24 0.09 28.33 
Av. Age_0 284 40.43 14112 39.64 0.79 1.95 
Av. school_0 284 11.74 14112 11.46 0.28 2.37 
Av. tenure_0  284 12.42 14112 11.15 1.27 10.20 
Female-share_0 284 0.31 14112 0.31 -0.01 -2.86 
Post-acquisition characteristics (from t=1) 
Size 284 149.58 14157 115.46 34.12 22.81 
Log(sales) 284 9.56 14086 8.94 0.62 6.44 
K/L 260 152.60 12707 142.48 10.12 6.63 
Y/L  284 22522 14150 10856 11666 51.80 
Export/sales 284 0.32 14086 0.23 0.09 26.63 
Av. Age 284 40.39 14157 40.01 0.37 0.92 
Av. School 284 11.73 14157 11.50 0.23 1.94 
Av. tenure  284 12.38 14157 11.47 0.90 7.29 
Female-share 284 0.30 14157 0.31 -0.02 -5.62 
Wages of low  educated from -1 to +3 
Log. Wage low ed._1  282 9.33 14127 9.25 0.08 0.89 
Log. Wage low ed._0 280 9.34 14083 9.27 0.07 0.78 
Log. Wage low ed.1 284 9.36 14127 9.28 0.08 0.80 
Log. Wage low ed.2 284 9.42 14126 9.30 0.11 1.21 
Log. Wage low ed.3 284 9.42 14116 9.32 0.10 1.04 
Wages of highly educated from -1 to +3 
Log. Wage high ed._1 278 9.64 13613 9.57 0.07 0.76 
Log. Wage high ed._0 274 9.63 13631 9.58 0.05 0.53 
Log. Wage high ed.1 266 9.65 13694 9.59 0.06 0.59 
Log. Wage high ed.2 280 9.70 13713 9.60 0.09 0.88 
Log. Wage high ed.3 279 9.71 13688 9.61 0.10 1.06 
Share of highly educated workers in employment from -1 to +3 
Empl.share_1 284 0.23 14157 0.19 0.04 16.31 
Empl.share_0 283 0.24 14112 0.20 0.05 19.12 
Empl.share1 284 0.24 14157 0.20 0.03 14.28 
Empl.share2 284 0.24 14157 0.21 0.03 13.62 
Empl.share3 284 0.23 14157 0.21 0.02 8.99 
Share of highly educated workers in total wage bill from -1 to +3 
Wb.share_1 284 0.28 14157 0.24 0.04 15.16 
Wb.share_0 283 0.29 14112 0.24 0.05 16.97 
Wb.share1 284 0.29 14157 0.25 0.04 12.81 
Wb.share2 284 0.29 14157 0.25 0.04 12.88 
Wb.share3 284 0.28 14157 0.26 0.03 9.50 
The sample consists of plants which were domestically owned in all the observations years before the period 1.  Acquired plants became 
foreign owned between -0 and 1. Non-acquired plants remained domestically owned until the period 3.  
Table 5 Effect of foreign ownership on average wages  
 Wages of low educated workers Wages of highly educated workers 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t-stat. Coef. t Coef. t 
Foreign  0.036 (11.32) 0.013 (4.14) 0.001 (0.31) 0.052 (12.19) 0.015 (2.28) 0.001 (0.12) 
Foreign_1     0.021 (5.13)     0.014 (2.02) 
Foreign_2     0.004 (1.10)     0.022 (3.39) 
Plant size 0.000 (25.75) 0.000 (6.75) 0.000 (6.78) 0.000 (9.44) 0.000 (7.92) 0.000 (7.94) 
Av. School  0.472 (9.11) 0.471 (9.12) 0.466 (9.02) 1.594 (19.30) 1.044 (11.07) 1.052 (11.16) 
Av. Sch. ^2 -0.019 (-7.97) -0.021 (-8.79) -0.021 (-8.69) -0.048 (-17.44) -0.031 (-9.87) -0.031 (-9.96) 
Av. Age  0.022 (6.69) 0.021 (7.12) 0.020 (7.07) 0.061 (20.08) 0.044 (14.04) 0.044 (14.08) 
Av. Age ^2 -0.000 (-6.49) -0.000 (-6.84) -0.000 (-6.77) -0.000 (-15.98) -0.000 (-10.50) -0.000 (-10.54) 
Av. Tenure  0.000 (4.57) 0.000 (2.05) 0.000 (2.12) 0.001 (11.10) 0.001 (11.30) 0.001 (11.30) 
Av. Tenure^2 0.000 (6.34) 0.000 (2.52) 0.000 (2.45) -0.000 (-6.17) -0.000 (-7.61) -0.000 (-7.58) 
Female-share -0.264 (-56.33) -0.144 (-13.62) -0.145 (-13.75) -0.130 (-20.66) 0.013 (0.69) 0.013 (  0.66) 
K/L 0.000 (3.66) -0.000 (-2.93) -0.000 (-2.90) 0.000 (1.34) 0.000 (1.06) -0.000 (1.08) 
 Export-share -0.004 (-1.32) -0.000 (-0.16) -0.000 (-0.12) 0.004 (1.05) -0.008 (-1.67) -0.008 (-1.62) 
Constant 6.222 (22.02) 6.217 (22.83) 6.249 (22.96) -4.815 (-7.71) -0.210 (-0.30) -0.273 (-0.39) 
Time Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Region Effects Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Plant Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Number of obs. 22216  22216  22216  21320  21320  21320  
R-sq  0.471  0.477 within 0.478 within 0.431  0.240 within 0.241 Within 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average monthly wage of the skill group in the plant. Schooling, age and tenure are measured as averages in the skill group in the plant. 
Foreign is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant is foreign-owned in current year, Foreign_1 is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant was foreign owned in the 
previous year, and Foreign_2 is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant was foreign owned two periods before.  
 
Table 6 Effect of foreign ownership on share of highly educated workers in employment/total wage bill  
 Share of highly educated workers in employment Share of highly educated workers in wage bill 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t-stat. Coef. t Coef. t 
Foreign  0.014 (4.43) 0.005 (2.14) 0.006 (2.03) 0.018 (5.29) 0.005 (2.11) 0.006 (1.94) 
Foreign_1     0.003 (0.93)     0.003 (0.99) 
Foreign_2     -0.006 (-1.96)     -0.006 (-1.87) 
Log(Whed/Wled) 0.035 (7.83) -0.011 (-3.24) -0.011 (-3.22) 0.177 (36.68) 0.122 (32.56) 0.123 (32.57) 
Log(K) -0.018 (-20.15) 0.000 (0.24) 0.000 (0.23) -0.018 (-18.78) 0.000 (0.10) 0.000 (0.09) 
Log(Y) 0.001 (0.52) -0.006 (-5.11) -0.006 (-5.10) -0.000 (-0.16) -0.007 (-5.69) -0.007 (-5.68) 
Log(sales) 0.030 (19.08) 0.002 (1.65) 0.002 (1.65) 0.033 (19.45) 0.002 (1.80) 0.002 (1.79) 
Export-share 0.020 (5.56) 0.004 (1.06) 0.004 (1.03) 0.022 (5.66) 0.004 (1.09) 0.004 (1.06) 
Constant -0.001 (-0.01) 0.243 (17.19) 0.243 (17.21) -0.050 (-0.59) 0.261 (17.19) 0.261 (17.21) 
Time Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Region Effects Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Plant Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Observations 20424  20424  20424  20424  20424  20424  
R-sq  0.194  0.055  within 0.055 within 0.238  0.089 within 0.089 within 
 
The dependent variable is the employment or wage bill share of highly educated workers in a plant. Foreign is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant is foreign-owned in 
current year, Foreign_1 is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant was foreign owned in the previous year, and Foreign_2 is a dummy variable which indicates whether plant 
was foreign owned two periods before. 
 
Table 7 Probit model to estimate the propensity score  
Dependent variable: Probability of foreign acquisition 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Plant size_0 -0.001 0.000 0.035 
(Plant size_0)2 0.000 0.000 0.229 
Log(sales)_0 0.113 0.030 0.000 
Export/sales_0 1.063 0.321 0.001 
(Export/sales _0)2 -0.765 0.345 0.027 
Industry exporter-share_0 -1.150 0.213 0.000 
Industry foreign-share _0 1.632 0.272 0.000 
Log(Yregion)_0 0.014 0.029 0.621 
Log(wage)_1 0.084 0 .200 0.673 
Av. School_1 0.076 0.035 0.031 
Av. Age_1 -0.018 0.013 0.163 
Av. Tenure_1 0.104 0.028 0.000 
(Av. Tenure_1)2 -0.002 0.001 0.027 
Ind. Dummies Yes   
Region dummies Yes   
Year dummied Yes   
Pseudo r-square 0.151   
LR chi2(31) 423.41   
Observations 14 441 100.00  
Treated 284 1.97  
Control 14 157 98.03  
The sample consists of plants which were domestically owned in all the observations years before the possible acquisition.  The 
explanatory  variables are from pre-acquisition periods.  _0 in end of the variable refers to period just before the acquisition (0), and _1 
to period 1-2 years before the acquisition (-1).   
 
 
Table 8 Effect of foreign acquisition on average wages of low educated workers: matching sample 
Method: Cross-section matching Difference-in-differences matching 
Outcome  Regression (OLS)  Nearest- Neighbor Kernel Regression (OLS) Nearest- Neighbor Kernel    
Log. average wage at t = 1 
ATT -0.012 -0.024 0.056 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
t-stat (-1.86) (-1.53) (5.48) (-0.08) (-0.18) (0.15) 
Treated  280 280  280 280 
Controls (obs.) (13867) 268 13637 (13867) 268 13637 
Log. average wage at t = 2 
ATT 0.030 0.021 0.097 0.042 0.043 0.043 
t-stat (4.54) (1.41) (8.99) (7.06) (3.88) (5.17) 
Treated  280 280  280 280 
Controls (obs.) (13867) 268 13637 (13867) 268 13637 
Log. average wage at t = 3 
ATT 0.014 0.004 0.079 0.025 0.026 0.025 
t-stat (2.06) (0.29) (9.69) (4.04) (2.30) (3.25) 
Treated  280 280  280 280 
Controls (obs.) (13867) 268 13637 (13867) 268 13637 
 
Table 9 Effect of foreign acquisition on average wages of highly educated workers: matching sample 
Method: Cross-section matching Difference-in-differences matching 
Outcome  Regression (OLS)  Nearest- Neighbor Kernel Regression (OLS) Nearest- Neighbor Kernel    
Log. average wage at t = 1 
ATT -0.010 0.002 0.051 0.005 -0.002 0.005 
t-stat (-0.88) (0.09) (3.94) (0.50) (-0.14) (0.34) 
Treated  261 261  261 261 
Controls (obs.) (13271) 248 12504 (13271) 248 12504 
Log. average wage at t = 2 
ATT 0.017 0.030 0.079 0.032 0.026 0.033 
t-stat (1.44) (1.73) (7.42) (3.03) (1.52) (2.09) 
Treated  261 261  261 261 
Controls (obs.) (13271) 248 12504 (13271) 248 12504 
Log. average wage at t = 3 
ATT 0.014 0.027 0.084 0.029 0.023 0.038 
t-stat (1.24) (1.55) (6.21) (2.60) (1.41) (2.70) 
Treated  261 261  261 261 
Controls (obs.) (13271) 248 12504 (13271) 248 12504 
 
First 3 columns in tables report the results of regression and matching analysis where the dependent variable is the level of outcome (wages of the skill group) in the period right after 
possible acquisition (t=1), 1-2 years after possible acquisition (t=2) and 2-3 years after the possible acquisition (t=3). Next 3 columns report the results of regression and matching 
analysis where the dependent variable is the difference between the outcome in the year just before the possible acquisition (0) and in different post-acquisition years (1,2, and 3).  The 
explanatory variables in regressions are exactly the same as are used to estimate the propensity score, which is used in the matching analysis. These are reported in table 7. Common 
support restriction is imposed in all regressions and matching.  T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. For matching results we report the boostrapped t-statistic. 
Table 10 Effect of foreign acquisition on the share of highly educated workers in employment:  matching sample 
Method: Cross-section matching Difference-in-differences matching 
Outcome  Regression (OLS)  Nearest- Neighbor Kernel Regression (OLS) Nearest- Neighbor Kernel    
Log. average wage at t = 1 
ATT 0.004 -0.012 0.027 -0.011 -0.017 -0.012 
t-stat (0.75) (-0.81) (2.93) (-2.20) (-1.88) (-1.29) 
Treated  283 283  283 283 
Controls (obs.) (13972) 264 13671 (13972) 264 13671 
Log. average wage at t = 2 
ATT 0.003 -0.018 0.025 -0.012 -0.023 -0.013 
t-stat (0.51) (-1.20) (2.86) (-2.30) (-2.43) (-1.88) 
Treated  283 283  283 283 
Controls (obs.) (13972) 264 13671 (13972) 264 13671 
Log. average wage at t = 3 
ATT -0.008 -0.028 0.014 -0.023 -0.034 -0.025 
t-stat (-1.17) (-1.90) (1.76) (-3.94) (-3.26) (-3.62) 
Treated  283 283  283 283 
Controls (obs.) (13972) 264 13671 (13972) 264 13671 
 
Table 11 Effect of foreign acquisition on the share of highly educated workers in wage bill: matching sample  
Method: Cross-section matching Difference-in-differences matching 
Outcome  Regression (OLS)  Nearest- Neighbor Kernel Regression (OLS) Nearest- Neighbor Kernel    
Log. average wage at t = 1 
ATT 0.005 -0.011 0.029 -0.010 -0.017 -0.012 
t-stat (0.71) (-0.70) (2.91) (-2.07) (-1.88) (-1.59) 
Treated  283 283  283 283 
Controls (obs.) (13972) 264 13671 (13972) 264 13671 
Log. average wage at t = 2 
ATT 0.005 -0.016 0.029 -0.010 -0.022 -0.012 
t-stat (0.70) (-1.00) (3.05) (-1.86) (-2.31) (-1.80) 
Treated  283 283  283 283 
Controls (obs.) (13972) 264 13671 (13972) 264 13671 
Log. average wage at t = 3 
ATT -0.006 -0.026 0.019 -0.021 -0.032 -0.022 
t-stat (-0.84) (-1.59) (2.00) (-3.43) (-3.03) (-2.68) 
Treated  283 283  283 283 
Controls (obs.) (13972) 264 13671 (13972) 264 13671 
 
First 3 columns in tables report the results of regression and matching analysis where the dependent variable is the level of outcome (employment or wage bill share) in the period right 
after possible acquisition (t=1), 1-2 years after possible acquisition (t=2) and 2-3 years after the possible acquisition (t=3). Next 3 columns report the results of regression and matching 
analysis where the dependent variable is the difference between the outcome in the year just before the possible acquisition (0) and in different post-acquisition years (1,2, and 3).  The 
explanatory variables in regressions are exactly the same as are used to estimate the propensity score, which is used in the matching analysis. These are reported in table 7. Common 
support restriction is imposed in all regressions and matching.  T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. For matching results we report the boostrapped t-statistic. 
Table 12 Effect of foreign acquisition on average wages by educational category: difference-in-differences matching results  
 
Difference-in-differences matching/regression results: 
 Regression (OLS) Nearest-neigbour matching Kernel matching 
Education: ATT t-stat Obs. ATT t-stat Treat/contr ATT t-stat Treat/contr 
Basic education          
T=1 -0.005 (-0.89) 13500 -0.011 (-1.03) 269/254 -0.003 (-0.29) 269/13249 
T=2 0.035 (5.19) 13500 0.028 (2.68) 269/254 0.036 (4.02) 269/13249 
T=3 0.023 (3.21) 13500 0.022 (1.87) 269/254 0.021 (2.12)  
Vocational education 
T=1 0.003 (0.54) 13742 -0.002 (-0.16) 275/262 0.005 (0.42) 275/13597 
T=2 0.042 (6.61)    13742 0.045 (  3.67) 275/262 0.044 (3.55) 275/13597 
T=3 0.025 (3.68) 13742 0.022 (2.00) 275/262 0.025 (2.22) 275/13597 
Lower university education 
T=1 0.005 (0.49) 13145 -0.001 (-0.08) 259/248 0.005 (0.38) 259/12450 
T=2 0.032 (3.13) 13145 0.022 ( 1.18) 259/248 0.035 (2.67) 259/12450 
T=3 0.030 (2.78) 13145 0.018 (1.03) 259/248 0.040 (2.99) 259/12450 
Higher university education 
T=1 0.032 (1.80) 6648 -0.000 (-0.01) 163/ 169 0.030 (1.01) 169/5850 
T=2 0.044 (2.22) 6648 0.011 (0.31) 163/ 169 0.039 (1.29) 169/5850 
T=3 0.055 (2.56) 6648 0.045 (1.24) 163/ 169 0.054 (1.90) 169/5850 
 
Common support restriction is imposed in all regressions and matching. The dependent variables is the pre-and post acquisition difference in the logarithm of the average earnings of the 
educational category in a plant. T=1 refers to difference between the pre-acquisition wages (period 0) and the wages at the period just after acquisition (1). T=2 refers to difference 
between the pre-acquisition wages and the wages at the period  1-2 years after acquisition (2).  T=3 refers to difference between the pre-acquisition wages and the wages at the period 2-3 
years after acquisition (3). The explanatory variables in regressions are exactly the same as are used to estimate the propensity score, which is used in the matching analysis. These are 
reported in table 7. Common support restriction is imposed in all regressions and matching.  T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. For matching results we report the boostrapped t-
statistic. 
 
